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Context, market economies and MNEs:  
The example of financial incentivization 
 
Abstract:  
This is a study of the impact of variety on the relative utilization of reward systems within and between 
capitalist archetypes: The study includes not only a closer focus on variety within and between 
coordinated market economies, but pays specific attention to the Japanese case, and a systematic 
comparison of the reward practices adopted by Multinational Enterprises vis-à-vis their local peers. The 
study uses the most recent wave of the international Cranet survey of HRM, and contrasts this with 
studies based on previous waves.   
 
Key words: varieties of capitalism; institutions; incentivization; share ownership schemes; 
performance related pay; MNEs. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This is a study of the impact of institutional variety on the relative utilization of reward systems 
within and between capitalist archetypes. A central theme within the extensive literature on 
comparative capitalisms has been the distinction between Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) 
and Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs), and how defining institutional arrangements in 
each are associated with distinct patterns of firm level practice (Hall & Soskice 2001; Hancke 
et al. 2007; Wood et al. 2014; Jackson & Deeg 2008). We explore not only the variations 
between market economies, but also how different manifestations of the CMEs can yield quite 
different results at firm level.  We explore the interaction of multinational enterprizes with 
these market economies.  
A key distinction between types of capitalism is the relative influence of shareholder rights, 
which are dominant in LMEs but which, within CMEs, are mediated by other stakeholder 
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concerns.  Controversy remains as to whether the CME category, encompassing such cases as 
Germany, the Nordic states and Japan, is so diverse as to be meaningless, and whether this 
category should itself be broken up into distinct sub-archetypes (Amable, 2003). The 
comparative capitalisms literature has also been critiqued (Whitley, 2001, 2010; Wood & Lane, 
2012) for the limited attention it gives to the role of multinational enterprises (MNEs). We 
examine the extent to which variations in national institutional regime and in geographical 
footprint are reflected in employee share ownership schemes and performance related pay 
aiming to promote a focus on short term profits and align employees with the shareholder value 
agenda. We use comparative surveys of human resource management (HRM) across a number 
of countries and compare the findings with previous research.  
The international business literature on institutions has focused more on the implications for 
firms of entering and operating in a particular context, rather than the defining features of 
national institutional frameworks and upon which specific sets of organizational practices are 
clustered where (Jackson & Deeg, 2008). Although the literature on comparative capitalisms 
has identified a range of institutional archetypes, it has tended to be light on detail when it 
comes to intra-organizational practices (Thompson & Vincent, 2010; Wood et al., 2014). 
Existing comparative work has focused on the degree of interdependence of employers and 
employees, and the extent of delegation to the latter (Morgan & Whitley, 2012; Thelen, 2014; 
Whitley, 1999). Within both the international business and comparative institutionalist 
literatures, and indeed, the international HRM literature, comparative analysis has neglected 
reward systems (Festing, et al., 2012).  
What comparative literature there is has focused on macro-economic trends or selective case 
study evidence (Thompson & Vincent, 2010; Wood, Brewster & Brookes, 2014) with a nascent 
stream of work using survey evidence that has focused on, and encountered, variations in 
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rewards between states, with some studies also looking at the cases of Eastern Europe and the 
Mediterranean world (Croucher et al., 2012, Brewster et al., 2013; Pendleton et al., 2003; 
Poutsma & De Nijs, 2003). A recent paper by Gooderham et al. (2015) deploys multi-level 
analysis to explore variations in reward systems, using the same Cranet dataset as this paper. 
They find that institutional and cultural effects directly impact on the relative utilization of pay 
for performance systems, with such systems being most prevalent in the USA (Gooderham et 
al., 2015).  
The distinctive contribution of this article is that it is more closely rooted in the literature on 
comparative capitalisms, with a particular focus on variety within the CME category.  In 
particular, we seek to evaluate what sets Japan apart; we also explore more closely the distinct 
features of the Nordic states.  
Further, as noted above, much of the literature on comparative capitalism tends to neglect 
MNEs: Notably, there is not a single reference to them in the landmark Hall and Soskice (2001) 
collection.  This study aims to build linkages between this undeniably important body of work 
and mainstream international business research by placing the distinctions between MNEs and 
other firms at the heart of the analysis.  As such, the study seeks to provide applied evidence 
as to variation within broad capitalist archetypes, how firms that span national boundaries differ 
in key aspects of reward systems, and the relative extent to which the latter may serve to align 
different categories towards particular agendas that may be at least partially driven by context 
(e.g. shareholder value optimization).  
Hence, we build on the literature through using trans-national survey evidence to explore not 
only variations in reward systems within and between firms, but also the extent to which they 
may vary according to national setting, and what this tells us about different taxonomies of 
capitalist archetypes, according particular attention to variation and sub-clusters within the 
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CME camp, following on increased theoretical interest in that issue (Amable 2003; Jackson & 
Deeg 2008; Wood et al. 2014). We find that dichotomous approaches to comparative 
capitalisms were of weaker explanatory power than multi-archetype approaches that unpack 
the CME category. Most notably, we find that both the Nordic Social Democracies on the one 
hand, and Japan on the other, differ significantly in their financial incentivization practices 
from Continental European Economies. We also note and discuss the distinctive position of 
MNEs, a firm type that has rather been neglected in the literature on comparative capitalisms.  
It is only in recent extensions of Business Systems Theory that the MNE has received 
significant theoretical attention (Morgan, 2012; Whitley, 2007): We seek to apply these 
relatively recent theoretical insights to firm level evidence.  
The paper is structured as follows. First, we introduce alternative institutional archetypes for 
categorizing national settings. Second, we review general trends in reward systems, explore 
likely variations in the utilization of share options and performance based pay systems 
according to different national setting, and identify a set of hypotheses. Third, we examine the 
role of MNEs. After explaining the survey method and data analysis, we outline and discuss 
our findings, before presenting our conclusions and drawing implications. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 National institutional archetypes 
The most cited literature on comparative capitalisms holds that the key distinction is between 
LMEs (the Anglo Saxon countries) and CMEs (the Rhineland economies, Japan and the Nordic 
states) (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Dore 2000). The former are distinguished by strong shareholder 
rights, the latter by strong stakeholder rights. Only these two models were believed to confer 
particular competitive advantage on firms. Other economies, it was held, are less successful 
and would tend to converge to one or other of these alternative models. Wood et al. (2014) 
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found much variation between national varieties of capitalism, highlighting the need for a 
closer evaluation as to what sets different constituent national economies apart. 
Recent developments of the literature on comparative capitalisms have indicated much 
variation within and between capitalist archetypes (Lane & Wood, 2014; Walker et al., 2014). 
In an early contribution, Whitley (1999) distinguishes between European CMEs and Japan, 
based on the relatively greater role of large firms in the latter, and the impact of historical ties 
such firms have with the state in regulating work and employment. Analyzing an eclectic range 
of empirical evidence, from labor market features through training to product market 
competition, Amable (2003) derives five categories, rather than two. Apart from the LMEs 
(which he calls market based systems) he splits the CME category into ‘meso-corporatist’ 
Japan, the Nordic Social Democratic Economies (SDEs)i and the Rhineland economies 
(‘Continental European Economies’). He also identifies a distinct Mediterranean category that 
falls beyond the scope of this study.  
2.2 Defining features of national systems: In-firm practices  
Whitley (1999) argues that key differences between national contexts include the degree of 
interdependence between employer and employee and the extent to which firms delegate 
decision making to the latter. While encompassing large areas of work and employment 
relations, and providing a basis for detailed empirical differentiation between capitalisms 
(Croucher, et al., 2012; Goergen, et al., 2012), this approach neglects perhaps the most basic 
issue of all - the relative proportion of value generated that is allocated to employees in return 
for work performed, and the manner in which it is done (Hyman, 1989; Wood et al., 2014). 
Indeed, a defining feature of LMEs is their focus on shareholder value, and on incentivizing 
managers to maximize short-term performance in this area (Dore, 2000), facilitating the firm 
in transferring much of the risk of market volatility to employees. Such risks may encompass, 
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with weaker organizational performance, the possibility of reduced pay and/ or the loss of 
employment completely.   
But, how do different types of capitalism differ in terms of firm practices?  There is only a 
limited literature on the comparative capitalisms and reward systems.  However, there are many 
excellent country studies on national trends in the practice of reward as well as comparative 
frameworks typically using inductive country categorizations, which we summarize in Table 
1. 
 
Table 1: Variety in Capitalism and Rewards 
Domain 
 
Theoretical 
Framework 
Capitalist 
Archetype 
 
Share 
Ownership 
Schemes 
Performance 
Based Pay 
Varieties of 
Capitalism 
(Hall and 
Soskice 2001) 
 
Liberal Market 
(‘Comparatment-
alized’) 
High (1) High (1) 
Coordinated 
Market 
Moderate to Low 
(2) 
Moderate to 
Low (2) 
Business 
Systems Theory 
(Whitley 1999) 
Liberal Market High High 
Coordinated 
Market 
(‘Collaborative’) 
Moderate to Low  Moderate to 
Low (2) 
Asian Capitalism 
(‘Highly 
Coordinated’) 
Moderate to 
High (4) 
Moderate to 
High (4) 
Social Systems 
of Production 
(Amable 2003) 
Liberal Market 
(‘Market Based’) 
High High 
Continental 
European 
Capitalism  
Moderate to Low 
(3) 
Moderate to 
Low (3) 
Social 
Democratic 
(Scandinavian) 
Capitalism 
Low (5) Low (5) 
Asian Capitalism 
(coordinated 
market) 
Moderate to 
High 
Moderate to 
High 
 
(1) D’Art & Turner, 2004; Pendleton, et al. 2001; Bender 2004. 
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(2) Soskice et al. 2009; Pendleton et al. 2001; Poutsma et al 2012. 
(3) Poutsma et al., 2012; Aumayr, et al., 2009, Kurdelbusch, 2002 
(4) Driffill, 2006; Calmfors & Driffill, 1988. 
(5) Driffill, 2006. 
 
2.3 Types of Variable Pay 
In relation to equity-based pay, there are considerable differences between managers and other 
stakeholders. Managers are likely to possess better information as to the actual capabilities, 
performance and prospects of their organization than either workers or outside investors (Aoki, 
2010). In contexts where shareholder rights are stronger, outside investors are likely to respond 
by seeking to tie managerial rewards to share price (Dore, 2000; Hall & Soskice, 2001) and 
there are strong inherent pressures towards incorporating stock options in managerial reward 
packages (Folkman, et al., 2007)ii. In contrast, share schemes aimed at other categories of 
employee may fulfill a range of objectives in addition to, and distinct from, maximizing 
shareholder value. These can include broadening the ownership base of the firm in order, for 
example, to make privatizations more palatable, encouraging employees to stay with the firm, 
offsetting pay restraint, or indeed, making the firm more accountable to employees as 
stakeholders. Reflecting this, there is much diversity in how such schemes are operationalized; 
variations can include the extent to which employee shares are held in trust, the relative voting 
rights assigned to employees, and the scale and proportion of shares assigned to employees 
(Morris et al. 2005). Hence, we separate out narrow share ownership schemes aimed at senior 
managers from those broader schemes aimed at other categories of workers. 
Unlike such share schemes, which are rarely formally covered in written employment 
contracts, except among senior executives (Poutsma & de Nijs, 2003: 865), performance 
related pay schemes (individual cash bonuses for meeting or exceeding agreed targets) may be 
part of the explicit contract and constitute an immediate proportion of pay. Individual 
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performance based pay may be targeted at specific categories of employees or an entire 
workforce (D’Art & Turner, 2004; Pendleton, et al. 2001). Organizational performance may or 
may not be related to the performance of the employees – external market conditions may play 
a significant role. In practical terms, this means that whilst rank and file employees may benefit 
from more performance based reward systems, they will at the same time seek to regulate pay 
systems to prevent the risks of poor organizational performance being shifted on to them. 
Whilst employees as a collective are stronger in dealing with the organization than they are as 
individuals, the former will often sacrifice the possibility of exceptional individual rewards for 
collective and standardized pay (Kerrin & Oliver, 2002).  
For all staff such pay is an attempt to link remuneration to performance. But it may not be 
effective, particularly for managers: Such schemes may be rather opaque, with executives 
sometimes being able to secure large bonus payments even in the face of abject failure (Kolb, 
2012: 23). Hence, we distinguish between managers and other categories of employee.  
2.4 Varieties of Reward System  
What is likely to be the impact of different varieties of capitalism on reward systems? We 
examine this successively for each of four categories (LMEs; CMEs; Japan; and the SDEs), 
distinguishing between hypotheses that relate to share ownership schemes as ‘a’ and 
performance related pay as ‘b’. 
What sets LMEs apart from all other types of capitalism is that the latter, either owing to 
stronger institutional constraints and countervailing stakeholder power (in the case of 
Continental European Economies), or less closely aligned institutions (in the case of less 
mature economies), are associated with weaker owner rights (Dore, 2000; Hall & Soskice, 
2001). Given the primacy of owners/ shareholders in the LMEs, this raises the issue of how 
they deploy their power to align managers with their returns maximization agenda (Dore, 2000; 
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Hall & Soskice, 2001). The most obvious manner in which this can be achieved is by tying 
managerial pay to the share price (Folkman et al., 2007). We might therefore expect that such 
schemes will be used more in LMEs than they are in economies where competing interests 
have more legitimacy and rights (Dore, 2000). Further, it seems likely that the greater 
credibility of share schemes in the LMEs will spill over into a greater acceptability of such 
schemes for a wider group of employees so that there will also be a difference between LMEs 
and CMEs (Continental European Economies; Japan; Social Democratic Economies) in the 
utilization of share ownership schemes aimed at other categories of employee. Gunnigle et al. 
(1998) argue that performance related pay is a feature of individualized work and employment 
relations, and indeed, is a mechanism for constraining the influence of employee collectives. 
Bender (2004) argues that firms are more likely to use performance related pay aimed at senior 
managers in contexts where there is a desire to ‘optimize’ managerial performance through the 
prospect of high incomes. Since firms tend to mimic their peers in order to remain competitive 
recruiters, whether such schemes work or not, they are seen as legitimate in such environments 
(Bender, 2004).  
Hypothesis 1a. Share ownership schemes will be more common in LMEs than in 
other capitalist archetypes. 
Hypothesis 1b. Performance related pay will be more common in LMEs than in 
other capitalist archetypes. 
In the Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) owner rights are mediated through the greater 
power of other stakeholder interests, including employees (Amable 2003; Hall & Soskice, 
2001; Dore, 2000). More patient investors with longer-term horizons have less interest in 
incentivizing managers to pursue short term shareholder value. Rather, the concern would be 
to ensure that the organization survives. So stock options for managers are less likely than in 
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LMEs.  Hall & Thelen (2009) argue that these markets are undergoing change, with a tendency 
towards dualism and segmentation but that nevertheless key institutional features retain their 
importance. Before 1998 stock options were illegal in Germany and they are still often targeted 
at groups rather than individuals when it comes to non-managerial employees (Casper, Lehrer 
& Soskice, 2009).   Whilst there has been considerable take up of stock options across 
continental Europe, they still constitute a smaller proportion of managerial pay than typically 
encountered in LMEs (Poutsma et al. 2012; Coffee, 2005). Such individual contingent rewards 
supplement, rather than supplant, traditional collectivist arrangements (Kurdelbusch, 2002).  
A gradual dissemination of individual incentive based pay systems may be taking place across 
continental European states (Aumayr, et al., 2009). Festing et al. (2012: 139) suggest that, in 
some countries, additional or bonus payments may in reality be non-discretionary and 
performance neutral, an example being the widespread use of Christmas ‘bonuses’, a de facto 
mechanism of partial pay deferral masked as bonuses, which does not link rewards to overall 
organizational performance or workers’ individual achievements (Kurdelbusch, 2002: 326). 
Looking at genuine performance related pay, Kraft & Ugerkovic (2006: 334) found that “only 
a small fraction of firms consider introducing such a scheme”, probably reflecting the extent 
to which such schemes really suit their needs and, it could be argued, known outcomes flowing 
from collectivist arrangements. Pendleton et al. (2001) suggest that in such settings, broad 
based schemes of this type remain relatively uncommon (in contrast to individual or narrow 
based share ownership schemes supplementing existing arrangements). Hence: 
Hypothesis 2a. Share ownership schemes will be less common in CMEs than in 
LMEs.  
Hypothesis 2b. Performance related pay will be less common in CMEs than in 
LMEs. 
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One of the limitations of the early literature on comparative capitalisms was the relative size 
and variation within the CME category. Japan is commonly included (Hall & Sockice, 2001), 
but Amable (2003) and Whitley (1999) suggest it represents an archetype in its own right. 
Indeed, the classic Calmfors & Driffill (1988) model of wage bargaining held that Japan is a 
highly decentralized system, with rewards often set at the individual level. At least when it 
comes to wage setting, Japan is on a par with LMEs such as the USA in this regard (Driffill, 
2006).  
Recent theoretical work on Japan has argued for increased liberalization there too, either 
because of the influence of the increased foreign ownership of large multinationals (Malcolm, 
2013; Sako & Kotosaka, 2012), or because of the pressures towards lower value added 
production paradigms facilitated through offshoring to China undermining existing 
coordinated mechanisms - liberalization by proximity (Wood, 2013). Both accounts point 
towards the differences between LMEs and Japan eroding and there is evidence of increased 
support for performance based pay amongst younger workers (Lee, et al., 2011) with perhaps 
two thirds of companies making use of performance related pay (Suzuki & Kubo, 2011). Since 
the 1997 reforms legalizing share ownership plans, a gradual dissemination of such schemes 
across Japan has been promoted as contributing directly to organizational performance (Kato 
et al., 2005). Given that wage determination was traditionally quite decentralized in Japan 
(Calmfors & Driffill, 1988), this might suggest that this is one area where the difference 
between Japan and the LMEs is now the least pronounced.  
Hypothesis 3a. Share ownership schemes are as common in Japan as in the LMEs  
Hypothesis 3b. Performance related pay is as common in Japan as in the LMEs  
As noted above, Amable (2003) suggests that the Nordic social democracies are distinct from 
CMEs and that the differences between them and the CMEs are as great as those with LMEs. 
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He argues (2003, p. 301) that of lesser importance than how rewards are structured is the 
relative extent of collective bargaining. At the very least, the latter will impose minima in terms 
of core wage rates even if supplemented at plant level by one or other form of bonus. For 
Amable (2003: 94), centralized wage bargaining will affect not only wage rates, but also how 
wages are structured, “solidaristic wage setting”. A strong emphasis on equity between firms, 
rather than the economic situation of the individual firm, is most conspicuous in the SDEs 
(Driffill, 2006). This would be at odds with share ownership schemes. Such wage setting gives 
real incentives to firms to enhance productivity, since they have limited room to increase profits 
through cutting wages. This is not necessarily dependent on centralized bargaining, as 
institutional devices such as wage policy proposals by national unions or employers’ 
associations may also promote coordination (Amable, 2003, p. 95). Hence, it can be argued 
that both share ownership and contingent individual performance related pay will be lower in 
the SDEs than in other types of capitalism.  
Hypothesis 4a. Share ownership schemes will be less common in SDEs than in 
other types of capitalism. 
Hypothesis 4b. Performance related pay will be less common in SDEs than in other 
types of capitalism. 
2.5 MNEs: crossing institutional domains 
Morgan (2012) argues that when operating abroad, MNEs straddle institutional domains, and 
are less rooted to or tied by institutional restraints in their country of domicile than their local 
counterparts. Ties and relationships linking them to local actors and interest groupings are less 
dense, allowing for greater room to maximize returns to headquarters than domestic, more 
deeply embedded firms (Morgan, 2012; Whitley, 2007). It has been argued that MNEs may 
play a key role in promoting practices associated with LMEs (Sako & Kotosaka, 2012; Dore 
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2008). MNEs may not discover, or be inclined to utilize, the full range of benefits accruing 
from national institutional frameworks, and may be more willing to depart from nationally 
dominant ways of doing things (Dörrenbächer & Geppert, 2011; Williams & Lee, 2011). 
Furthermore, one of the sources of competitive advantage of MNEs is their ability to transfer 
organizational practices, including HRM practices, across their geographically dispersed 
operations, even if the dimensions of practice transfer are influenced by different mechanisms, 
and in the case of HRM practices, subsidiary embeddedness in the local institutional context 
seems to play an important role (Ahlvik & Björkman, 2015). The evidence base is incomplete 
and somewhat contradictory: Geppert et al (2013) found that in Germany, there were stronger 
restraints on adopting practices from abroad than in the UK, an LME. Lavelle et al. (2012) 
found considerable diversity in MNE practice, according to organizational characteristics, 
country of origin, sector and whether a firm was unionized or not. Gooderham et al. (2015) 
find that MNEs were more likely to drive performance based pay systems, suggesting that they 
are less bound by the constraints imposed by any single context. We capture both the location 
of the firm and whether it is headquartered elsewhere, enabling MNE subsidiaries to be 
identified, in order to explore differences between them and local firms.  
Hypothesis 5: MNE subsidiaries are more likely to practice share ownership schemes 
and use individual performance based pay than their local counterparts. 
3. DATA AND METHODS 
3.1 Data Collection 
We use data from the latest available 2009/ 2010 Cranet survey, containing evidence on human 
resource management and labor relations in 14 countries (Cranet, 2011) for 1,514 public and 
private sector firms. Following Amable (2003) and Lane (2007) we use four specific ‘capitalist 
varieties’iii: LMEs (the liberal market economies of the USA, UK and Australia); SDEs (the 
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social democratic economies of Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Finland), CMEs 
(Continental European Capitalist economies of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria 
and Switzerland), and Japan. To compare within each variety we take the largest economy, by 
size, as the reference country (the USA for LMEs, Sweden for SDEs, Germany in CMEs, and 
Japan as a stand-alone variety).iv 
The Cranet survey is designed by a multi-cultural team, translated and then back translated 
(Brislin, et al., 1973; Matsumoto & van de Vijver, 2010) into the language(s) of each country. 
The questions are posed to the most senior HRM person in the organization and are, as far as 
is possible, ‘factual’: That is, in order to cut down on self-reporting errors and single rater bias 
(Gerhart, et al., 2000), potential cultural bias, and common methods bias (Podsakoff et al., 
2003) they ask for presence or absence, numbers or percentages, rather than opinions that may 
be congeneric in quality.v  
Each variable, or group of variables, allows us to characterize a particular facet of 
organizational employment practice. In all but the largest countries the research uses a full 
population survey; in the larger ones it uses stratified random sampling to ensure that the 
organizations receiving the survey are balanced in terms of sector and (above the threshold of 
100 employees) size and are broadly representative of each economy (Brewster et al., 2007). 
The full set of variable definitions is defined in Table 2, while Table 3 summarizes the 
descriptive statistics and correlations between variable. Response rates vary with country, 
ranging from just over 10% to nearly 40%, with most countries falling towards the latter end 
of the spectrum – a relatively good result for full population surveys (c.f. Cooke et al. 2000).  
Table 2. Variable definitions 
General Category Specific Category Survey Question 
Compensation 
Managers offered ownership 
options 
Combines two questions "Do you offer any stock options to [management 
employees]? Yes or no." and  "Do you offer any employee share schemes to 
[management employees]? Yes or no." 
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Prof/tech offered ownership 
options  
Combines two questions "Do you offer any stock options to [professional/technical 
employees]? Yes or no." and  "Do you offer any employee share schemes to 
[professional/technical employees]? Yes or no." 
  
Clerical/manual offered 
ownership options  
Combines two questions "Do you offer any stock options to [clerical/manual 
employees]? Yes or no." and  "Do you offer any employee share schemes to 
[clerical/manual employees]? Yes or no." 
  
Managers offered 
performance related pay 
Do you offer variable pay (pay that varies at intervals, e.g.. annually/monthly/weekly) 
to [management employees] based on [individual performance]? Yes or no. 
  
Prof/tech offered 
performance related pay 
Do you offer variable pay (pay that varies at intervals, e.g.. annually/monthly/weekly) 
to [prof/tech] based on [individual performance]? Yes or no. 
  
Clerical/manual offered 
performance related pay 
Do you offer variable pay (pay that varies at intervals, e.g.. annually/monthly/weekly) 
to [clerical/manual] based on [individual performance]? Yes or no. 
Stakeholders 
commitments to 
pay bargaining 
Unionisation rates 
What proportion of the total number of employees in your organization are members 
of a trade union?:  (0; 1-10; 11-25%; 26-50%; 51-75%; 76-100%)  
  
Joint consultative committee 
or works committee 
Do you have a joint consultative committee or works council? Yes or no. 
  
Employer recognition of 
unions in collective 
bargaining 
Do you recognise trade unions for the purpose of collective bargaining? Yes or no. 
  
Firm a member of an 
employer's association 
Is your organization a member of an employers’ association? Yes or no. 
Country Effects 
Research and development 
expenditure (% of GDP) 
Expenditures for research and development are current and capital expenditures 
(both public and private) on creative work undertaken systematically to increase knowledge, 
including knowledge of humanity, culture, and society, and the use of knowledge for new 
applications. R&D covers basic research, applied research, and experimental development. 
  
General government final 
consumption expenditure (% 
of GDP) 
General government final consumption expenditure (formerly general government 
consumption) includes all government current expenditures for purchases of goods 
and services (including compensation of employees). It also includes most 
expenditures on national defence and security, but excludes government military 
expenditures that are part of government capital formation. 
  
Foreign direct investment, 
net outflows (% of GDP) 
Foreign direct investment are the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting 
management interest (10 per cent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating 
in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, 
reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in 
the balance of payments. This series shows net outflows of investment from the reporting 
economy to the rest of the world and is divided by GDP. 
  
Year change 
Percentage change in GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $), between 
2005/6 and 2008/09 
  
MNE 
MNE operating outside their country of origin are identified by matching situation 
where firms answer the question country identified by the question where is "Country 
organization based in." does not match the country where the firm is located. 
Firm Effects Employees Number of employees. 
  Public Public sector firm. 
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Table 3. Descriptives and correlationsa 
 
 
a Descriptive statistics; n=1,354 pairwise; *p<0.05. 
 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
1 Management	Ownership	Scheme 0.259 0.438 1.000
2 Prof/Technical	Ownership	Scheme 0.162 0.368 0.7345 * 1.000
3 Clerical/Manual	Ownership	Scheme 0.131 0.338 0.6362 * 0.835 * 1.000
4 Management	Incentive	Pay 0.589 0.492 0.2527 * 0.183 * 0.138 * 1.000
5 Prof/Technical	Incentive	Pay 0.502 0.500 0.2373 * 0.213 * 0.148 * 0.678 * 1.000
6 Clerical/Manual	Incentive	Pay 0.380 0.486 0.159 * 0.136 * 0.182 * 0.484 * 0.629 * 1.000
7 Liberal	Market	Economies 0.151 0.358 0.0195 * 0.037 * -0.038 * 0.025 * 0.053 * -0.030 * 1.000
8 Social	Democratic	Economies 0.230 0.421 -0.1095 * -0.085 * -0.057 * -0.191 * -0.257 * -0.183 * -0.230 * 1.000
9 Coordinated European Economies 0.208 0.406 0.009 -0.080 * -0.086 * 0.104 * 0.054 * -0.027 * -0.216 * -0.280 * 1.000
10 Japan 0.094 0.292 0.243 * 0.315 * 0.341 * 0.132 * 0.166 * 0.209 * -0.136 * -0.176 * -0.166 * 1.000
11 European	Union 0.717 0.451 -0.159 * -0.193 * -0.159 * -0.058 * -0.103 * -0.090 * -0.478 * 0.172 * 0.202 * -0.513 * 1.000
12 Unions	recognition 42.636 34.275 -0.037 * -0.017 * 0.019 * -0.119 * -0.170 * -0.115 -0.226 * 0.445 * -0.006 -0.014 * 0.108 * 1.000
13 Joint	consultative/works	committee 0.589 0.492 0.016 * 0.018 * 0.046 * 0.022 -0.044 * -0.029 -0.237 * 0.240 * 0.196 * 0.029 * 0.243 * 0.434 * 1.000
14 Employer's	association 0.559 0.497 0.026 * 0.002 * 0.036 0.033 * -0.059 * -0.041 * -0.182 * 0.291 * 0.115 * -0.032 0.160 * 0.324 * 0.292 * 1.000
15 MNE	subsidiary 0.197 0.197 0.090 * 0.012 -0.015 0.110 * 0.074 * 0.009 0.039 * -0.091 * 0.074 * -0.200 * 0.183 * -0.078 * -0.026 0.019 1.000
16 log[employees	(000s)] 6.105 1.572 0.186 * 0.150 * 0.148 * 0.119 * 0.066 * 0.046 * 0.029 * 0.058 0.068 * 0.223 * -0.135 * 0.231 * 0.277 * 0.209 * -0.060 1.000
17 Pubic	sector 0.186 0.389 -0.202 * -0.137 * -0.139 * -0.258 * -0.203 * -0.143 * 0.138 0.173 * -0.109 * -0.146 * -0.012 * 0.215 * 0.071 * -0.058 * -0.181 * 0.082 * 1.000
18 R&D	expenditure	(as	%	GDP) 2.245 1.062 0.063 * 0.098 * 0.094 * 0.012 0.039 * -0.035 * 0.109 * 0.503 * 0.093 * 0.365 * -0.368 * 0.279 * 0.274 * 0.222 * -0.201 * 0.324 * 0.111 * 1.000
19 Outward	FDI	(as	%	GDP) 5.513 11.504 0.045 * 0.005 -0.017 0.068 * 0.027 -0.007 -0.082 * -0.212 * 0.274 * -0.079 * 0.293 * -0.074 * 0.094 * -0.018 0.176 * -0.040 * -0.033 * -0.132 * 1.000
	fdi_out2008 20 Govt expenditure as (% of GDP) 20.374 3.749 -0.081 * -0.066 * -0.031 * -0.139 * -0.227 * -0.160 * -0.272 * 0.763 * -0.103 * -0.156 * 0.399 * 0.366 * 0.279 * 0.265 * 0.075 * -0.003 * 0.070 * 0.297 * 0.114 * 1.000
				govt2008 21 Change	in	GDP	per	capita -0.017 0.046 -0.038 * -0.069 * -0.067 * -0.028 * -0.036 * 0.010 -0.174 * -0.444 * 0.171 * -0.184 * 0.188 * -0.188 * -0.131 * -0.130 * 0.082 * -0.178 * -0.103 * -0.630 * -0.081 * -0.361 * 1.000			yr_change
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3.2 Dependent variables 
In line with our hypotheses, we utilize two dependent variables: The use of share ownership 
schemes and the use of performance-related pay. Two questions were asked to enable us to 
examine the extent and depth of use of each schemes relating to employees at three distinct 
ranks (management; professional/ technical; and clerical/ manual employees): (i) ‘Do you offer 
any stock options or employee share schemes to [management or professional/technical or 
clerical/manual employees]? Yes or No.’, and (ii) ‘Do you offer variable pay (pay that varies 
at intervals, e.g. annually/monthly/weekly) to [management or professional/technical or 
clerical/manual employees] based on [individual performance]? Yes or No’. 
3.3 Independent variables 
3.3.1 Co-Determination and Contingent Pay 
It can be argued that there is as much variety within national archetypes as between them 
(Walker et al., 2014). Internal firm dynamics and ownership characteristics might have a 
stronger effect than national setting in determining the relative use of financial incentives 
(Kolb, 2012; Jones et al., 2012). Firms may have ‘space’ even within national institutional 
frameworks to make real strategic choices according to variations in firm characteristics 
(Poutsma et al., 2012: 1513). We use a series of variables to capture the extent of co-
determination in work and employment relations, and the extent to which this may impact on 
the relative use of financial incentives. The variables cover labor institutions, such as trade 
unions, collective bargaining, employee initiatives works councils and joint consultative 
committees (JCCs), and employers via employers associations. 
In many CMEs, there remains widespread use of co-determinative mechanisms impacting on 
the social market of work (Brewster et al., 2007; Whitley, 1999). The presence of unions, 
collective bargaining and works councils or joint consultative committees (JCCs) will serve to 
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constrain managerial power regardless of contexts (Brewster et al., 2007). If all countries are 
liberalizing, the relative pace of firm reform may vary according to the countervailing power 
of other interests (Streeck, 2009). Strong employers’ associations may deter organizations from 
departing from national and sectoral norms when it comes to pay setting. Hence, it could be 
argued that the presence or absence of trade unions and co-determinative mechanisms will 
impact on the nature and extent of performance based pay. 
3.3.2 Other Firm Specific Influencers 
We capture other salient firm features, such as whether the organization operates in the public 
or private sector (Public). We also control for size of the organization (proxied by number of 
employees: (log(Employee)).  
3.3.3 Industry, Country and Regional Effects 
In incrementally innovative manufacturing industries, firms are more likely to leverage 
competitive advantage through closer ties with suppliers, customers, and workers, whereas, 
higher tech activities and much of the service sector are characterized by adversarial 
competition and shorter term, more contingent, relations between the firm and its employees 
(Hall & Soskice, 2001). So in addition to capturing the differing compositions of economic 
activity across countries we incorporate a full set of industry dummies based on the European 
Union, NACE, categories at the 2-digit level.vi  
We include country specific fixed effects to capture country differences within market 
economy types. The fixed effects are country specific institutional and other country specific 
differences that we cannot directly observe and some country specific observable attributes. 
We capture these country specific effects by looking at four variables. Level of innovation 
intensity is measured by the R&D expenditure, both public and private, as a percentage of 
GDP. National degrees of innovation intensity are seen as indicators of the focal country 
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commitment to stimulate innovation. Higher degrees of R&D would be associated with more 
innovation, and hence, a need to offload some of the risks onto employees. Conversely, 
incentive pay via ownership schemes also serves as a mechanism to lock highly skilled labor 
into longer-term commitment to the focal firm, as well as inhibiting knowledge transfer and 
protecting intellectual property. It has been argued that a defining feature of LMEs is a well-
developed high technology sector with a commensurately greater emphasis on R&D (Hall & 
Soskice, 2001). We also include outward FDI as a percentage of GDP as an indicator of the 
country’s openness as well as the degree of competitiveness of the national economy, and 
general government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP) provides an indicator as to the 
extent of the public sector as public organizations are less likely to make use of such schemes 
(Prentice et al., 2007:13). Data for each of these indicators is collated from the World Bank. 
Recent work by Gooderham et al. (2015) found that one (but only one) of Hofstede’s country 
specific cultural measures (‘masculinity/ femininity’) was a significant determinant of 
performance related pay systems (Hofstede, 2010), so we applied that as a control.  
Finally, we capture the European Union as a regional grouping to account for the homogenizing 
effects of some labor market policies across groups. There is much debate about the impact of 
Europeanization, which has variously been presented as a liberalizing force, and one that has 
spread a common social model. Within the area of work and employment relations, the 
European Court of Justice has had a recent track record of focusing on upholding individual, 
rather than collective rights, and has made a series of rulings that have restricted the options 
open to unions (Dølvik & Visser, 2009). Whilst the Europeanization process may have 
encompassed some attempts to promote greater social dialogue, it has been argued that in 
recent years these efforts have been on the retreat (Currie & Teague, 2016; Prosser, 2011). 
3.4 Model 
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We undertake a mediation analysis (general treatments of the methods are found in 
MacKinnon, 2008; Hayes, 2013, while two recent contributions from the International 
Business literature come from Villar, 2014; Fernandez-Mesa, 2015). Specifically we assume 
that one variable Y, depends on X and Z. Furthermore, X=F(Z, z1). The impact of each variable 
can be expressed graphically: 
Y 
A                       B 
X   Z 
           C 
We can run various regressions: Y=f(X) we estimate the total effect of X on Y. Y=F(Z) we 
estimate the total effect of Z on Y. Y=F(X,Z) we estimate the direct effect of X on Y, once we 
controlled for Z, (arrow A), and the direct effect of Z on Y once we controlled for X (arrow B). 
But, since there is a causal effect from Z to X, for example, we would be interested in 
distinguishing the part of the total effect of X on Y that is due to the indirect effect caused by 
Z: That is Z affects X that affects Y. In this case, we need the estimated effect of Z on X (arrow 
C). 
In modeling performance incentives we need to account for both the key explanatory variable 
association of wage setting and institutional variables impacting upon comparative capitalisms, 
as well as the impact of wage setting institutions directly on those incentives. To account for 
these we provided a nested structure first estimating 
𝑉𝑜𝐶𝑘  =  𝛽0  +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗 𝑍𝑖 + 
𝐽
𝑗−1
∑ 𝛽𝑠 𝑍𝑠𝑖 + 
𝑆
𝑠−1
∑ 𝛽𝑐  𝑍𝑐𝑖 + 
𝐶
𝑐−1
∑ 𝛽𝑟 𝑍𝑟𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑘
𝑅
𝑟−1
 
 (1) 
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Where k is the comparative capitalism in which firms, i, operate, and where Z are its 
determinants. These determinants are captured and operate at the firm, i, industrial sector, s, 
country, c, and regional group, r, levels. Doing so enables us to extract the indirect impacts of 
the Z variables. Then we can utilize the predicted values of the comparative capitalism models 
in the second stage estimates: 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖  =  𝛽0  +  ∑ 𝛽𝑘  𝑉𝑜𝐶𝑘 + 
𝐾
𝑘−1
∑ 𝛽𝑗  𝑍𝑖 + 
𝐽
𝑗−1
∑ 𝛽𝑠 𝑍𝑠𝑖 + 
𝑆
𝑠−1
∑ 𝛽𝑐  𝑍𝑐𝑖 + 
𝐶
𝑐−1
∑ 𝛽𝑟 𝑍𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑘
𝑅
𝑟−1
 
 
(2)
 
Where incentivization is the set of dependent variables - the extent and depth of use of 
ownership schemes or incentive schemes relating to employees at three distinct ranks 
(management; professional/ technical and clerical/ manual employees) – and the explanatory, 
X variables, are the direct impacts again at the firm, industry sector, country and regional 
grouping (EU) levels. 
4 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
We examine sets of results in relation to: 1. indirect impacts of financial incentivization via 
comparative capitalisms; 2. direct effects in relation to international comparative systems and 
MNEs. Both effects are estimated simultaneously, however we discuss them consecutively for 
clarity. There are minor differences in indirect estimation as there are minor differences in the 
number of firms who responded to questions relating to each of the different measures (with a 
difference in the number of observations missing between the most completed survey question, 
management stock option, ranging between 12 and 96 observations), however the findings are 
qualitatively identical. 
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4.1 Indirect Effects of Compensation Setting and Indirect Effects on Financial 
Incentivization 
Table 4a examines the impact of unionization, employers’ association membership, collective 
bargaining and works councils, as well as a set of firm, industry and country effects in shaping 
each capitalist variety. These are derived using logit estimations with marginal effects reported 
with the dependent variable being whether the firm is located in a particular capitalist variety 
and are generally precisely determined.vii 
As prefigured in previous analyses (Amable, 2003; Hancké, et al., 2007; Whitley 1999) the 
findings in Table 4a underline the systematic differences between firms located in LMEs, who 
have lower use of coordinating labor market institutions when compared to other varieties, and 
the SDEs countries who are systematically higher utilizers. Firms based in CMEs are more 
likely to have employee works councils, consultative committees and employee associations, 
but less likely than the SDEs to recognize unions. Firms based in Japan also make more use of 
JCCs and employers’ associations. So far, the results provide confidence that the data is 
relatively representative. 
We find the presence of MNE subsidiaries is not significantly related to LMEs, SDEs and 
CMEs but is, negatively, related to Japanviii. Furthermore, the country specific effects - 
proxying for innovation (R&D intensity), efficiency of domestic investors to enter international 
markets (MNE outward investment/ foreign net direct investment outflows as a percentage of 
GDP) and public sector presence - are well determined and intuitively signed, with government 
sector expenditures for example being higher in the Nordic SDEs, but lower in LMEs.  
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Table 4a. Factors indirectly influencing financial incentives through varieties of capitalism 
 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10. Coefficients are marginal effects. White-corrected z-statistics in parentheses.
1 2 3 4
Dependent	variable LIBERAL	MARKET SOCIAL	DEMOCRATIC CONTINENTAL JAPAN
ECONOMIES ECONOMIES MARKET	ECONOMIES
coeff z-stat coeff z-stat coeff z-stat coeff z-stat
	TU_prop Institutional	Labour Unions recognition -0.001 *** (7.28) 0.001 *** (9.93) 4.8E-07 ** (6.13) 2.5E-06 (0.82)
Union recognision*Masculity -4.8E-05 ** (2.21) -9.2E-05 *** (2.74) 2.5E-07 *** (3.41) 3.9E-05 *** (2.37)
		JCC_WC Joint consultative/works committee -0.059 *** (5.28) 0.010 * (1.96) 0.064 *** (8.23) 0.000 ** (2.49)
employ~c Market	Institutions Employer's association -0.026 *** (2.79) 0.033 *** (7.43) 0.023 *** (3.32) 0.004 *** (3.16)
Firm	Effects MNE	subsidiary -0.001 (0.97) 0.000 (0.03) 0.063 (1.42) -0.125 *** (7.71)
	lemploy log[employees	(000s)] 0.005 ** (1.68) -0.005 ** (4.57) -0.004 *** (2.15) -0.004 *** (3.09)
		public Pubic	Sector 0.086 *** (5.80) 0.045 *** (4.29) -0.022 ** (2.24) 0.005 *** (11.81)
fdi_ou~8 Country	Effects R&D	expenditure	(as	%	GDP) 0.011 ** (2.51) 0.009 *** (4.05) 0.154 *** (29.84) -0.014 *** (7.65)
govt2008 Outward	FDI	(as	%	GDP) 0.002 *** (9.49) -0.003 *** (18.40) 0.010 *** (34.85) 0.000 *** (9.28)
yr_cha~e Govt expenditure as (% of GDP) -0.022 *** (17.25) 0.016 *** (25.75) -0.003 *** (3.17) -0.003 *** (17.54)
Change	in	GDP	per	capita -0.019 *** (13.52) -0.011 *** (15.79) 0.036 *** (33.49) -0.004 *** (15.73)
Country	Dummies YES YES YES YES
Industry	Dummies YES YES YES YES
N 1,514 1,514 1,514 1,514Log	pseudo	likelihood -1033 -419 -1092 -496
Pseudo	R 2 0.463 0.795 0.443 0.271
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4.2.  Direct Effects of Compensation Setting and Direct Effects on Financial 
Incentivization 
We turn to the core analysis with the results concerning the direct effect of capitalist varieties 
on financial incentivization being found in Table 4b. 
 
First we look at the results of the differences in utilization of share ownership schemes and 
performance related pay between the different types of CME and how far each are from  LMEs, 
looking at both managerial and non-managerial ranks.  
In general, the results imply that the use of share schemes in LMEs, CMEs, and Japan are 
similar. This offers support for Hypothesis 3a, but challenges Hypothesis 1a. The only 
exception is that use is lower for CME’s professional staff, however the finding is only weakly 
supported (significant at the 10% level). LMEs exhibit higher use of performance pay then 
other capitalist archetypes, except for Japan where the use of performance pay is similar 
(partially supporting Hypothesis 1b and fully supporting Hypothesis 3b). Although share 
options were somewhat less common in CMEs than liberal markets (lending support for 
hypothesis 2a), the differences were rather less pronounced when compared to other types of 
capitalism. We find that share ownership schemes are less likely to be found in SDEs than in 
the other types of capitalism (supporting Hypothesis 4a), and that performance pay is less 
common in SDEs than other types of capitalism (supporting Hypothesis 4b).  
The results are already indicative. The similarity of findings across market economies may 
reflect the gradual dissemination of share ownership schemes in continental Europe. However, 
the findings also indicate that the differences between CMEs and liberal markets are more 
pronounced in terms of the relative utilization of performance related pay than in the use of 
share ownership schemes (confirming Hypothesis 2b).  
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Table 4b. Direct influences on financial incentive 
 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10. Coefficients are marginal effects. White-corrected z-statistics in parentheses. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
Dependent	variable MANAGEMENT PROF/TECH CLERICAL/MANUAL 	MANAGEMENT PROF/TECH CLERICAL/MANUAL
OWNERSHIP	SCHEME OWNERSHIP	SCHEME OWNERSHIP	SCHEME PEFORMANCE	PAY PEFORMANCE	PAY PEFORMANCE	PAY
coeff z-stat coeff z-stat coeff z-stat coeff z-stat coeff z-stat coeff z-stat
CAPITALISMS SOCIAL	DEMOCRATIC	ECONOMIES -0.256 ** (2.50) -0.353 *** (3.75) -0.301 *** (4.02) -0.366 *** (3.45) -0.444 *** (3.79) -0.507 *** (4.48)
(ref.	Liberal	Market CONTINENTAL	MARKET	ECONOMIES -0.098 (1.07) -0.163 * (1.93) -0.037 (0.55) -0.221 ** (2.27) -0.338 ** (3.23) -0.228 ** (2.28)
Economies) JAPAN 0.184 (1.02) 0.007 (0.04) -0.016 (0.14) -0.053 (0.29) -0.125 (0.66) 0.209 (1.21)
Firm	Effects MNE	subsiduary 0.196 *** (5.25) 0.053 ** (2.08) 0.058 ** (2.11) 0.067 ** (1.98) 0.105 *** (2.84) 0.104 *** (2.67)
log[employees	(000s)] 0.068 *** (4.67) 0.030 ** (2.21) 0.022 ** (2.30) 0.028 ** (2.11) 0.034 ** (2.37) -0.003 (0.22)
Pubic	sector 0.103 * (1.72) -0.050 (1.00) -0.056 (1.44) -0.130 ** (2.08) -0.164 *** (2.57) -0.029 (0.46)
Institutional	Labour
Joint consultative/works committee
-0.001 (1.21) 3.8E-04 (0.88) 3.7E-04 (1.03) -7.7E-05 (0.15) -1.9E-04 (0.33) 0.001 (0.93)
Market	Institutions Employer's association 0.039 (1.12) 0.027 (0.86) 0.039 * (1.72) 0.031 (0.92) 0.003 (0.08) 0.036 (1.03)
Unions recognition 0.023 (0.62) 0.056 ** (1.96) 0.058 ** (2.55) 0.075 * (1.92) 0.039 (0.93) 0.046 (1.13)
Strategic importance of HRM
- .2 7 1.1 . 27 0.8 . 39 * 1.72 . 31 0. . 03 .08 . 3 .0
Union recognision*Masculity 3.6E-05 (0.16) -4.9E-04 (1.32) 0.001 (0.58) 1.7E-05 (0.72) 5.5E-05 (0.19) 3.5E-05 (0.57)
Regional	Cluster European	Union -0.227 ** (6.59) -0.239 *** (8.27) -0.193 *** (7.79) -0.023 (0.62) -0.007 (0.18) -0.071 * (1.85)
Country	Effects R&D	expenditure	(as	%	GDP) 0.084 * (1.92) 0.083 ** (2.31) 0.128 *** (4.17) 0.042 (0.88) 0.138 *** (2.49) 0.237 *** (4.33)
Outward	FDI	(as	%	GDP) 0.006 *** (2.87) 0.003 ** (2.22) 0.000 (0.01) 0.004 *** (3.20) 0.004 * (1.68) 0.002 (0.96)
Govt expenditure as (% of GDP) -0.022 ** (2.27) -0.032 *** (3.78) -0.027 *** (4.72) -0.006 (0.62) -0.008 (0.86) 0.017 (1.62)
Change	in	GDP	per	capita 0.001 (0.90) 0.005 (0.90) -0.956 * (1.67) -0.962 (1.30) -0.002 (0.76) -0.748 (1.01)Individualism . .19 . 2 .75 .002 .05 .001 0.45 . 1 .4 .001 0.48
Country	Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry	Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 1,514 1,449 1,502 1,418 1,354 1,388
Log	pseudo	likelihood -764 -633 -542 -874 -893 -915
Pseudo	R 2 0.210 0.197 0.214 0.139 0.139 0.109
26 
MNE subsidiaries are different: They use share ownership schemes at managerial level one 
fifth more often than local firms, with ownership schemes being provided at lesser rates for 
staff at lower ranks in the organization. Performance pay is as commonly used for professional 
and technical staff in MNE subsidiaries as it is for management. The influence of MNEs may 
go some way to explaining the spread of such schemes in the CMEs. Overall, both, shared 
ownership schemes and performance related pay are more likely to be found in MNEs than in 
their local counterparts, supporting Hypothesis 5. 
Turning to the control variables, unsurprisingly, for managers there is no evidence that higher 
institutional coordination through employees (trade unions, works councils or JCCs) or 
employers’ associations directly impacts upon share schemes. Table 4a implies that those 
institutions influence stock option incentives only indirectly via capitalist varieties with these 
effects reinforcing the already lower rates of utilization of share schemes in Nordic SDEs. 
However, there is evidence that higher unionization rates and greater participation in 
employers’ associations increase firm’s provision of share schemes to lower ranks.  
Lower rates of share ownership are associated with membership of the European Union, 
consistent with the ‘triad’ regionalist view (Arregle, et al, 2009; Rugman & Verbeke, 2004). 
However we find no evidence that EU membership impacts upon performance pay, confirming 
the limited mediating effects of Europeanization (Prosser, 2011). Furthermore, larger firms are 
more likely to use either stock options or performance pay at managerial and professional/ 
technical level but not at the lower level, reflecting a bias towards more closely encouraging 
senior ranks towards a shareholder value agenda. Industry fixed-effects are jointly significant 
(with F-statistics of 100 or more across estimations), as are the country fixed effects.  
Turning to the country level controls, countries that have greater R&D intensity as a proportion 
of GDP have higher share option utilization across all ranks as well as more performance pay 
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at lower ranks, perhaps indicating that nations with higher technology intensive industries see 
it as appropriate to incentivize their managers via share options rather than via performance 
pay. As expected, higher amounts of government expenditure as a proportion of GDP reduce 
the extent of financial incentives.  
5. DISCUSSION 
Our study confirms that context has a significant effect on the relative utilization of share 
ownership schemes and individual performance related pay. We also confirmed that it is 
unhelpful to consider CMEs as a single coherent category: Rather it comprises a number of 
distinct archetypes, each with characteristics of their own. More specifically, we found clear, 
firm-level evidence that both share schemes and performance related pay are more likely to be 
found in LMEs in comparison to the Nordic SDEs. It can be argued that SDEs are the CMEs 
that have been most resistant to liberalization, and retain the strongest collectivist elements 
(Goergen et al., 2009): This would explain the limited headway such forms of contingent pay 
have made in such settings. It can be argued that, as such countries have relatively high tax 
rates, non-pay elements of executive reward will assume greater importance (De Silva, 2016). 
In contrast, in Germany, in an effort to retain jobs, there has been a spread of concession 
bargaining, centering on flexibility in working time and in the allocation of rewards and how 
this is linked to organizational performance (Doellgast & Grier, 2017). This does not mean that 
the German system per se is eroding; rather, it can be argued that it has been reinforced in other 
areas, most notably through the vitality of the industrial vocational training system (Thelen, 
2014). 
Such distinctions are less visible within other CMEs. In particular, share schemes were more 
common in Japan, which is commonly seen as a CME. Share ownership schemes there across 
both the managerial and professional levels of the organization were as common as in LMEs, 
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though not so at lower organizational levels. However, more secure employment means that 
share ownership schemes are less a mechanism for compensating workers for job insecurity, 
and more a means of binding employer and employee together in the long term. 
As noted above, share ownership schemes serve somewhat different purposes when aimed at 
rank and file or at managers. For clerical and manual workers the purposes would encompass 
risk sharing and may be intended to make more palatable a focus on share price maximization 
rather than other organizational priorities. For managers such incentives are aimed at solving 
presumed agency problems. Of course, these different rationales are mutually compatible, and 
reflect a common systemic orientation towards prioritizing short-term shareholder value.  
The findings regarding Japan confirm the predictions of Calmfors and Driffill (1988) that the 
country represents an example of decentralized wage setting, sharing common features with 
LMEs in this regard. Individual performance based pay has never been prohibited by law, 
although share ownership schemes were restricted. Recent accounts highlight the extent to 
which the Japanese system has liberalized in recent years, with knock-on effects on reward 
systems (Sako & Kotosaka, 2012). However, it can be argued that whilst Japan is certainly 
becoming more diverse in terms of pay and reward systems, the importance of seniority in 
wage setting persists: While contingent reward systems have spread, their effects have been 
‘modest’ (Jackson & Moerke, 2005; Keizer, 2011). This means that employees have a strong 
incentive to remain with firms – reinforcing the traditional lifetime employment model 
amongst larger organizations – and ensures that even individually orientated pay setting retains 
a strong collective flavor. So employees are more likely to retain shares they have been 
allocated, in contrast to LMEs, where they often serve the purpose of a type of emergency 
saving to be cashed in in the event of redundancy.  
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Does this mean that contemporary Japan has more in common with LMEs than other CMEs 
(c.f. Hall & Soskice, 2001)? Recent comparative institutionalist work has highlighted the extent 
to which each national system is internally diverse, combining seemingly contradictory 
features, but in such a manner as to still retain its broad character (Wood & Lane, 2012). In 
other words, institutions are never perfectly aligned, and this will make for seemingly 
contradictory rules, conventions, and associated sets of practices co-existing. Indeed, 
‘unexpected‘ practices, at odds with the general systemic norm, may impart a necessary degree 
of flexibility, compensating for distortions generated elsewhere in the system (Crouch, 2005). 
Actually, we also found that firms based in Japan made significantly more use of Joint 
Consultative Committees and employers’ associations than their LME counterparts.  Other 
work has suggested close similarities between Japan and the CME ideal type in a range of other 
areas, such as the relative density of inter-firm and stakeholder ties, high levels of employment 
security, and the centrality of incremental innovation (Dore, 2000; Thelen and Kume, 2006).  
Hence, we can conclude that, whilst undeniably a CME, Japan has some similarities with LMEs 
when it comes to pay setting. The coexistence of very different practices over a sustained period 
of time without undermining the overall operation of a CME would suggest that national 
capitalist archetypes can accommodate a fair degree of difference in core systemic features: 
This, in turn, might suggest that reforms to coordinated markets in a single area may have only 
limited effects in others. 
6. CONCLUSION 
This study differs from earlier comparative work using the Cranet data in its inclusion of Japan, 
its core focus on differences within the Coordinated Market Economies category and its 
examination of the position of MNEs. In contrast, earlier work concentrated on differences in 
pay systems between Liberal and European Coordinated Market Economies, the characteristics 
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of rewards in other institutional frameworks, and the relative centralization of bargaining 
(Pendleton et al. 2003; 2001; Poutsma & De Nijs 2003; Brewster et al. 2013; Croucher et al. 
2010; Kalmi et al. 2012). At the same time, our study highlights some continuities with the 
findings of the earlier work. This includes persistent differences between the practices 
encountered in LMEs and other types of capitalism - pressures to convergence notwithstanding 
(Streeck, 2009). This confirms that institutional arrangements are deeply embedded, and not 
easily derailed even if structural changes in the global capitalist ecosystem take place.  It would 
also suggest that it is possible for quite deregulated practices in some areas to co-exist with 
relatively high levels of coordination in other areas (Walker et al., 2014). 
Whilst it has been argued that the Continental-European Market Economies have moved 
towards greater use of share schemes in the last decade or so (Kalmi et al., 2012), such schemes 
are still used less and have not diffused to lower levels of organizations. The use of share 
ownership schemes and performance based pay is even less common in the Nordic Social 
Democratic Economies. These findings confirm the strength of collectivist institutions in the 
SDEs, and the differences between them and Continental Europe. This would suggest that the 
manner in which shareholder rights are mediated in CMEs varies according to specific 
institutional features: Institutions are not similarly aligned across CMEs. While it is certainly 
possible to unpick what variations in rules (e.g. centralization of bargaining, worker rights) 
may determine differences in practice, and hence, discard national institutional archetypes 
altogether, doing so would discount the importance of unwritten conventions and norms of 
acceptable behavior in determining differences within national settings. We must be careful 
not to make assumptions: Japan is closer to LMEs than other CMEs when it comes to the 
utilization of share ownership schemes, although these effects are mediated by much higher 
levels of job security, providing workers with stronger incentives to retain the shares they have 
been allocated into the long term. Complex assemblies of institutions have close and direct 
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effects on specific organizational practices, and similarity between countries in one area does 
not make for similarities in others (Amable, 2003).  In most other respects – ranging from 
employment security to codetermination to a strong commitment to the development of firm 
and industry specific human capital - Japan is clearly a CME (Thelen and Kume, 2006). What 
this study highlights is that institutional features do not need to be closely coordinated and 
mutually supportive for a national model to persist: Indeed, an ability to accommodate 
seemingly very different sets of firm level practices might be considered to be not only an 
indicator of internal systemic flexibility, but also one of strength.  
MNE subsidiaries are more likely to use share schemes and performance related pay than their 
indigenous counterparts. It is indeed possible that MNEs may serve as ‘norm entrepreneurs’, 
pioneering and disseminating new practices (Dore, 2008; Sako & Kotosaka, 2012). On the one 
hand, the differences are relatively small and not always significant. They are most pronounced 
at managerial level, which is likely to mold managerial choices and strategies. This adds 
credence to the view that MNEs are less rooted in individual national institutional 
environments and more able to innovate (Morgan, 2012; Dunning, 1981). However, especially 
when it came to categories of employee other than managers, the differences with local 
businesses are not large. Perhaps common practices within specific national settings make for 
a greater predictability, lowering transaction costs in dealing with middle and lower ranking 
staff (Marsden, 1999). Following local norms will also be a simple way to generate the 
legitimacy that such foreign organizations need (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Kostova, Roth & 
Dacin, 2008; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999).  
A new feature in this research, the use of country level controls, confirms that, for example, 
R&D and government influence may appear to be related to particular comparative capitalisms 
but are not directly related to incentivization. Even here, however there are some findings that 
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challenge the accepted wisdom. Neither share schemes nor performance related pay are more 
common in workplaces with collective bargaining, works councils and JCCs (Kato & 
Morishima, 2002; Ichniowski, et al., 1997): There is no direct effect. What we did find is that 
these institutions are strongly associated with different versions of comparative capitalisms and 
that the influence on incentivized pay systems operates indirectly at this level.  
At a theoretical level, the study confirms variation within CMEs, opening the question as to 
whether LMEs might be similarly diverse. This constitutes fertile ground for future research. 
Our study highlights the extent to which key features of reward system continue to vary 
according to setting, and whether an organization is multinational or not. MNEs are more likely 
to use share options, but mainly for higher job bands. Despite predictions of general 
liberalization, it is evident that Continental-European capitalism, and above all, the SDEs retain 
their distinctive features, including a weaker emphasis on performance related pay and share 
ownership schemes for both senior managers and rank-and-file. Finally, although MNEs are 
clearly different in that they are more likely to promote individual performance related pay and 
share ownership schemes irrespective of setting - reflecting, perhaps, the global ecosystemic 
dominance of the LME model and associated firm level practices - these differences were not 
always strong, especially when it came to non-managers. In other words, whilst MNEs are less 
‘tied’ to particular national ways of doing things, and may be more likely to pioneer new 
practices, the extent of such innovation remains constrained by local institutional realities. 
6.1 Limitations and Scope for Future Research 
Like all research, this has limitations. Our evidence is drawn from organization with more than 
100 employees, which is a minority in most countries, and covers only a limited number of 
countries. This reduces the generalizability of the findings. Our data examine the practice of 
MNE subsidiaries rather than the policy of Headquarters. And whilst it covers the main 
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methods of incentivization considered in the literature there are other forms it does not cover 
and which may yield different results. Overall, however, the results here are rather robust and 
stand up to further examination.  
There are two key areas where further research would be beneficial. First, our data comes from 
the senior HRM specialists managing incentivization but we have no views from the managers 
and employees themselves about the implications of such practices or their attitudes towards 
them. Second, this study has been cross-sectional and there is a need for more longitudinal 
research. Looking back at earlier waves of Cranet we see strong path dependence, although 
more systematic analysis of changes over time, especially within the Coordinated Market 
Economies category, would add more nuanced insights. Interestingly, much of the literature on 
comparative capitalisms has tended to focus on variations in areas such as tenure and skills, 
rather than on differences in firm level reward systems (Amable 2003; Hall & Soskice 2001). 
Whilst this paper goes some way to redressing this lacuna, it also raises further questions as to 
what really distinguishes firm practices in differing national contexts, and the extent to which 
seemingly contradictory practices may compensate for, or even reinforce, each other. These 
gaps can be filled by further empirical research at the firm level and we look forward to such 
developments.  
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i In fact Amable refers to Scandinavian, rather than Nordic, countries. But as he includes Finland in this group it is more accurately 
characterized as Nordic. 
ii There is a theoretical distinction between the two main types of equity pay: share ownership schemes (a commitment of shares to managers 
and/or employees), and stock options (where the employee has a right to buy shares at a specific price) – these may be vested (i.e. full title is 
only obtained after some years’ service) or instantly saleable (Kolb, 2012: 16). Kolb (2012) argues that the latter has become increasingly 
popular. In practice, the distinction between the two types of share ownership (allocations/ share ownership schemes or stock options) is not 
always clear; many firms themselves using the terms inter-changeably. Furthermore, the relative use of the terms ‘share ownership schemes’ 
and ‘stock options’ varies according to national locale, with the former used more in Europe and the latter more in North America. Hence, for 
the purposes of this research, we combine these two categories. In practice, they are generally understood to mean the same thing when 
considered across national boundaries, although there is much variety within these categories according to both category of employee they are 
aimed at, and how employees respond to them (c.f. Geppert et al. 2013; Ataullah 2014). When we separated the two types out in the data, we 
found little in the way of significant differences in their relative incidence according to national setting.  
iii More formal cluster analysis confirming these intra-European groupings is found in earlier work (Goergen et al., 2012) and was re-
examined for this paper. 
iv We have experimented extensively with the clusters and find that the removal of single nations does not qualitatively alter our findings. 
v Given the data are self-reported and collected through the same questionnaire during the same period of time common methods bias might 
be a matter of concern. Common methods variance, which is attributed to the measurement rather than the constructs of interest, suggests that 
there may be systematic measurement rather than the constructs of interest and that there may be systematic measurement error and bias. 
There are several reasons why CMV is unlikely to bias this study. First, the extent that CMV is related to the type of measurement, with 
attitudinal data being most affected and performance and satisfaction methods being much lower. Cote and Buckley (1987) found CMV in 
41% for attitudinal and 23% for performance and satisfaction measures. All the variable used in the study are factual with the majority (other 
than firm size) requiring simple binary responses. They derive from a senior company HRM figure who will have an overview of the firm and 
its HRM practices. Second, CMV may occur when there is a dependent and independent variable are conflated by measure. This is more likely 
to occur when the questions asked are not separated in the questionnaire. The questions relating to incentivization and the institutional and 
other dependent variables are in different sections of the survey (Podsakoff, et al., 2003). Third, we conduct Harman’s one-factor test 
(Podsakoff, et al., 2003). Not surprisingly given the factual nature of the questions asked and their separation in the survey we did not find 
any one general factor. 
vi The sectors being - Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing; Energy and water; Chemical products; Other manufacturing; Building and civil 
engineering; Retail and distribution; Transport and communication; Banking, finance, insurance; Personal, domestic, recreational services; 
Health services; Other services; Education; Local Government; Central Government; and Other. 
vii We used the moderation programmes build into STATA, and applied bootstrapping methods to calculate. We note however that there are 
a variety of programmes enabling moderation analysis and testing. 
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viii Using data from Botero et al., (2004), Gooderham et al. also find that labour market regulation had a role to play mediating the effects of 
‘masculinity’. We did not find that labour market regulation to be a statistically significant variable in initial analysis and so have not 
included it in this study.   
